Prague
ter layer is not immediately structured by the system of language, though there are certain types of regular correspondence, which we want to discuss later.
From a viewpoint of research in logic the layer of (linguistic) meaning can be identified with that of Frege's sense , and with certain reservations or extensions it can be regarded as a counterpart of Carnap's 3 intensional structure4; the aspects of the layer of (cognitive) content studied by logic appear there in the shape of intensional units (concepts, propositions, truth conditions, etc.).
Other viewpoints from which the dichotomy should be studied systematically are those of psychology, of artificial intelligence, and, of course, of the siences studying the individual domains of (factual) knowledge. In the present paper we concentrate on the relationship between the linguistic view- and on the set of eated objects, assignin~. grass to horses, mice to cats, but not mice to horses or grass to cats,...
In linguistic writings pursuing this
line we find such arguments as those by Kuno 6 , according to whom with The chicken on hi s farm is healthy it is linguistically relevant that on a farm there is usually moire than one chicken at a given time point; similarly Fillmore 7 argues that "the wind.., is using its own energy", or "the wind is the direct cause of the door's opening". linguistic meaning and the (specific, more or less ad hoc) factual knowledge of the given area will be to a certain degree specific to this area.
1.2
However, is i~ actually possible to find a clearly specified boundary between meaning and content, to A rather general rule changes e.g. The structure of natural language, including its patterning of the units of meaning, has to be empirically studied and explicitly described. The ambiguities and irregularities inherent to natural language may then be removed, while its flexibility (com~ected with a necessary ~nount of vagueness) is retained. In such a way natural language understanding can be given a sound general basis. This view is supported by ~Jilks 25, who duly argues that the formulae in knowledge representations should represent the meanings of words, and nothing else: a man knows about the real world nothing more than can be expressed in natural language (giving examples of the verbs to break -which need not have an Instrumental, and to~, which should have one), Also RitchJe 26 comes close to this standpoint saying that hypotheses "must be based more on the actual patterns within language, rather than on current dogmas ..."; he is also right in pointing out the usefulness of choosing semantic categories generally applicable, thus avoiding the risk of having to construct "as many different analyzing grammars as there were domains of discourse".
It seems to be justified to combine the study and description of language with those of the domain(s) covering the given area of content and of psychological phenomena, to be able to construct systems of general applicability as well as to reach a better understanding of cognition.
